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Abstract—Contemporary healthcare has witnessed a wide 
deployment of Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs), 
which have the capability to be controlled remotely, making 
them equally accessible from both home and hospitals. The 
therapeutic benefits of ICDs seem to outweigh potential 
security concerns, yet overlooking the presence of malicious 
attacks cannot be justified. This study investigates the scenario 
where an adversary falsifies a controller command and sends 
instructions to issue high electric shocks in succession. We 
propose a novel security hardening mechanism to protect data 
communications between ICD and controller from malicious 
data manipulations. Our proposed method verifies the 
correctness of an external command with respect to the history 
of heart rhythms. The proposed method is evaluated using real 
data. Multi-aspect analyses show the effectiveness of the 
proposed scheme. 
 
Keywords — Heart defibrillator, implant, security, wireless 
sensor networks. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, the application of Internet of 
Things (IoT)-enabled consumer electronics devices in the 
field of e-health has surged tremendously [1], [2]. 
Nowadays, a wide range of Implantable Medical Devices 
(IMDs), such as pacemakers, neuro-stimulators and 
Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs) [3], can 
provide patients with valuable therapeutic functions in 
addition to detection, monitoring and recording of patients’ 
vital data [4].  
Cardiovascular disease, particularly irregular heart 
rhythm, is one of the biggest health concerns and it is the 
leading cause of death for both women and men [5]. ICDs 
and pacemakers aid in regulating cardiac functions in 
patients who are at high-risk with life-threatening 
ventricular arrhythmias. They can also prevent cardiac 
arrests and sudden cardiac death [6]. These devices are 
implanted inside the human body and they would normally 
communicate with an external controller. ICDs transmit 
patient identification and physiological data, and receive 
control instructions for operational parameters over 
unencrypted bidirectional communication channels [7].  
Pacemakers and ICDs are energy efficient, resource 
constrained devices that require an external controller to 
coordinate their actuations through running computationally 
expensive data analytics. To this end, an external controller 
is subscribed to ICDs. The controller aggregates and 
analyzes the data stream coming from the implants. The 
controller would use the results of its data mining to make 
better decisions and actuate certain therapeutic functions to 
improve the functionality of ICDs. Despite the lifesaving 
benefits, communications between the controller and the 
ICD is in plaintext. This leaves ICDs vulnerable to man-in-
the-middle attacks through which data could be manipulated 
and this may lead to life-threatening situations. A potential 
attack can even exploit the transmitter of the controller, 
which discloses device identification upon probe. This 
makes it possible for the attacker to replay the controller’s 
command and remain in a position to maliciously maneuver 
critical parameters in the implanted device, which could be 
life threatening for the patient. 
These devices, in their current form, have very limited or 
no security mechanisms incorporated [13]. A number of 
defense methods for wireless insulin pumps have been 
investigated by Hei and Du [14]. However, cardiac devices 
vastly remain vulnerable to attacks. Barnaby Jack studied 
the possibility to command pacemakers to deliver a deadly 
shock of 830 volts form a laptop in 50 feet vicinity [15]. A 
group of researchers, in an effort to improve the safety of 
patients, used a software radio and an oscilloscope to 
partially reverse engineer the communication protocol of an 
ICD eliciting that the radio-based attacks, compromising 
patient safety, could easily be carried out [8].  
A recent study [16] has reported unidentifiable 
communication attempts through wireless medium that 
trigger the ICD to deliver high-energy shocks in normal 
heart rhythm. In another study [10], the researchers showed 
that it is possible to activate the ICD through bypassing 
current activation procedure, as well as reverse engineer the 
communication protocol for a long-range channel. For non-
emergency scenarios, one of the many solutions that aimed 
to address the security issues of implantable medical devices 
(IMDs) was to design security techniques that cut down on 
energy overheads [17]. Moreover, despite the fundamental 
importance of IMDs, the software running on these devices 
remain property of their manufacturers, implying that no 
attempt to test its security can be made by an independent 
party [12]. This becomes crucial in the backdrop of proven 
successful attempts to gain unauthorized access to these 
devices through software backdoors. 
This study investigates the security issues of ICD 
communication protocol through the lens of man-in-the-
middle attacks. In addition, we propose a novel security 
hardening mechanism to protect data communications 
between ICD and controller from malicious data 
manipulations. This study investigates the scenario where an 
adversary falsifies a controller command and sends 
instructions to issue high electric shocks in succession. Our 
proposed method verifies the correctness of an external 
command with respect to the history of heart rhythms. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
elaborates the architecture and communication model of 
ICDs. The ICD network and attack models are detailed in 
section II. Section III presents specifications and algorithmic 
description of the proposed method. Formal verification is 
described in Section IV. The performance of the proposed 
method is analyzed in Section V. Finally, conclusions are 
drawn in Section VI. 
II. BACKGROUND 
ICD constantly monitors heart rhythm and identifies 
irregular patterns. ICD classifies the category, to which the 
heart arrhythmia belongs [18]. The classification of heart 
arrhythmia plays an important role in patient’s therapy since  
irregular heart behaviors, such as Ventricular Fibrillation 
(VF), require a shock treatment to make the heartbeat 
normal. Upon detection of a VF, the ICD algorithm puts the 
capacitor to charge. After the capacitor is charged, the ICD 
checks to see if VF has subsided or not. If VF is persistent, 
then ICD delivers a shock. This process is repeated until 
normal heartbeat is restored. The energy of the shocks 
delivered is pre-programmed in the algorithm that runs 
inside the ICD and performs monitoring and therapeutic 
functions. The level of shock energy is varied depending on 
the response of the heart to the therapy; it is increased at 
carefully calculated intervals (usually up to 10 J) or 
decreased, likewise. To set the upper limit of shock energy 
that can be delivered to the patient, DFT is calculated and 
saved in the device after the placement of the implant in 
human body [19]. Defibrillation Threshold (DFT) is the 
maximum energy value of therapy for a particular patient 
with a given heart condition and history.  
Fig. 1 depicts the diagram of data communications 
between an ICD, that is, implanted in a patient, and a 
controller, that is, inside the healthcare facility. The patient 
uses a Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved 
portable monitor for self-assessment of their ICDs. This data 
is sent over the Internet to data servers that make it available 
to clinicians for further analysis [6]. The medical 
practitioner uses a controller to remotely monitor, program 
and actuate the ICD. The controller is equipped with an 
interface that enables the medical practitioner to input 
multiple parameters to the ICD through wireless 
communication [3]. 
Apart from setting a number of heart-related parameters, 
the controller is used to deliver one or more shocks to 
restore normal heartbeat. These shocks are categorized as 
low-energy (less than 5 J) or high-energy (up to 30 J). High 
energy shocks have higher probability of being successful 
[23]. Additionally, the ICDs are programmed to 
continuously monitor and record heart rate variability, detect 
arrhythmia, and perform classification into one of the 
categories such as Atrial Fibrillation (AF), Atrial 
Tachycardia (AT), Ventricular Tachycardia (VT), and 
Supraventricular Tachycardia (SVT) amongst many. The 
focus of this study is on two types of heart conditions at the 
time when ICD receives an external command:  
 
1) Normal Sinus Rhythm: Fig. 2 (upper panel) shows the 
condition of EGM when the heart beats normally. In this 
state, the heart does not require any therapy (shock). 
 
 
Fig. 1.  ICD-controller communication model. 
 
Fig. 2. Upper panel: An EGM of normal heart rate (NSR). Lower panel: 
EGM of Ventricular Arrhythmia (VF). 
 
 
TABLE I. NOTATIONS 
Notation Description 
DSt Device status at given time t 
EComt External command at time t 
EComt+k External command at time t+k 
P Device status: Paused 
R Device status: Running 
RS Device status: Reset (start from beginning) 
 
 
2) Ventricular Fibrillation: Fig. 2 (lower panel) shows 
the heart in Ventricular Fibrillation (VF) state. Out of many 
arrhythmias, this is a critical condition where heart beats 
200 times or more per minute and usually requires a shock 
to restore NSR.  
 
A. Attack Model 
TABLE I lists the notations used in this section. As 
pointed out in [20], the device to device communication 
between ICD and controller (D2D link) is insecure and 
vulnerable to data integrity attacks [21]. In the following, 
we discuss a ‘blind therapy override’ attack scenario. 
The ICD receives an antagonist command, instructing 
the device to pause the routine algorithm execution and 
issues one or more high-energy shocks in succession to the 
patient. This external command (ECom) does not comply 
with the current heart condition, which is a primary factor in 
determining the basis for the shock(s) to be delivered. The 
ICD capacitor can deliver multiple shocks with the same 
charge. ECom is defined as  
 
     
EComt= ⋃ 𝐸𝐷௣௥௣ୀଵ ,                 (1) 
 
where ED denotes the high energy shock(s) to be delivered 
and p is a variable which denotes the instances that may vary 
from 1 to r. ED is defined as a function of capacitance Ca 
and shock waveform voltage V as follows [18]: 
 
  𝐸𝐷௣ =
ଵ
ଶ
𝐶𝑎௣𝑉௣ଶ.   (2) 
At a given time t, ECom is programmed to deliver all 
shocks in succession. Each shock instance is capable of 
charging the capacitor for these ‘blind’ therapies. The 
shocks are termed as blind, because they execute blindly, 
without taking into account the current heart condition, thus 
posing a fatal attack.  
 
III. PROPOSED SECURITY HARDENING METHOD 
In this section, we propose an integrity protection 
mechanism that can mitigate the attack scenarios explained 
in Section II. This mechanism complements the existing 
algorithm working inside the ICD. Our proposed mechanism 
adds security features in the functionality of ICD and is 
suitable for the resource-constrained microcontrollers used 
in the implanted device. The status number of ICDs can be 
used to detect malicious interruptions/commands, because 
the status number would pause in the presence of external 
interruptions/commands. When an intrusion is detected, a 
flag is set to 1. This will show the type of access that the 
external command seeks, that is, capacitor access (flag = 1). 
A variable access type is used to store this value. 
Let m denote memory cells, where physiological data are 
stored and i denote the index of m. For r number of 
available memory locations, memory M and index I are 
defined as M = {m1, m2, ..., mr} and I = {i1, i2, ..., ir}. We 
assume that ig, ih, il ∈ I are indexes for locations mg, mh, ml ∈ 
M that store the values of the current heart condition, the 
dynamically calculated DFT, and E' (Equation (5)), 
respectively. The algorithm uses three memory pointers *p, 
*q and *r to point to memory locations mg, mh, and ml, 
respectively.  
The variable access type with value Therapy first saves 
the incoming shock strength into a variable Thss, which is 
later used to compare against DFT (upper shock limit set for 
the device). The statement following the pointers makes a 
comparison *p = NSR. If this holds true, it implies the heart 
is functioning normally and no therapy is required. 
However, if the heart condition is VF, then it is a confirmed 
case for therapy. In this case, a safety zone (SZECom) is 
computed. The safety zone has two limits: an upper limit 
and a lower limit. The value of Thss is checked with respect 
to these limits so that ICD would be able to assess the safety 
of the external energy level for therapy. SZECom is defined as 
 
 
𝐸ᇱ ≤ 𝑇ℎ௦௦ ≤ 𝐷𝐹𝑇ௗ௬௡ ,           (3) 
 
where 
𝐷𝐹𝑇ௗ௬௡ = 𝐸ᇱ + ?̅? + 10,          (4) 
 
and  
𝐸ᇱ = ⎾ ∑ 𝐸ത௏ி೔
௡
௜ୀଵ /𝑛⏋,           (5) 
where 
 𝐸ത = ∑ 𝐸ௗ௪ௗୀଵ /𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡.          (6) 
 
The notation Ē in Equation (6) is the expected value of 
energy delivered Ed per episode of VF. If w is assumed to be 
the different number of times the therapy is administered for 
each episode of VF, Tcount stores this value. 
The value of E' in Equation (5) gives us the upper limit 
of any fraction obtained through computing average for a 
sample of n, since the safety zone should contain close and 
strict boundaries for providing maximum safety and most 
efficient therapy results. 
The notation s in Equation (7) is the standard deviation 
of the values of energy delivered ranging from 1 to w for 
each episode of VF. Ē, being the average of the cumulative 
energy per episode, gets subtracted from each value of 
energy delivered and squared. The sum of all such values 
divided by n-1 gives the standard deviation for Tcount 
number of therapies per episode of VF. 
 
𝑠 = ඨ
∑ ቀாೇಷ೏ିாതቁ
మೢ
೏సభ
୬ିଵ
,           (7) 
 
𝑠̅ = ⎾ ∑ 𝑠 𝑛⁄௡௜ୀଵ ⏋,           (8) 
 
where 𝑠̅ is the ceiling of the average of n values of s for a 
sample of n VF episodes. Again, the ceiling is acquired to 
obtain the upper limit of energy. DFT dynamic, DFTdyn is 
the value of standard deviation ?̅? added to E' to get the upper 
limit or the maximum energy that defibrillates successfully. 
An additional energy of 10 J in Defibrillation Threshold is 
set as the value of the upper limit of shock energy that can 
be used for setting shock parameters in an attempt to restore 
heart function to NSR in minimal number of attempts [20]. 
A variable BurstCount is used to keep track of how 
many times therapy is administered for a single episode of 
VF. For each shock initiated, BurstCount gets incremented 
by one. It is then compared with xˊ which is defined as the 
floor of ?̅?. 
𝑥ᇱ = ⎿?̅?⏌,   (9) 
 
where ?̅? = ∑ 𝑉𝐹௕்௖௢௨௡௧௡௕ୀଵ /𝑛.  
 
The notation ?̅? is the average of single values of Tcount 
for our sample of n VF episodes. The reason for flooring ?̅? 
is to keep the total number of therapies administered to a 
minimum, given that only high-energy shocks are under 
consideration. If BurstCount exceeds the average value of 
number of therapies, the shock is aborted.  
Next, if the value of the shock strength from the external 
command is found to be greater than the upper safe limit, 
only a single shock equal to the strength of upper limit will 
be initiated. The algorithm also performs a classification of 
resultant heart condition after the first shock has been 
administered. This is a requirement in order to get an 
updated heart condition.   
For all successive therapy commands, these conditions 
are checked repeatedly until the heart condition is found 
normal (NSR). This also helps to rule out the possibility of 
invalidating a command issued from an authentic source 
taking care of an emergency scenario. Algorithm 1 
summarizes the functionality of detection of an external 
command and classification procedure.  
 
 
Algorithm 1: Detection of an external command and its 
classification 
Input: EComt  
Output: Therapy or Warning 
Initialization:  SZECom  = False; BurstCount = 0 
1: DSt ← P;                          //external command detected 
2: if Flag = 1 then                      
3:        AccessType ← Therapy;  
4: if AccessType = Therapy then  
5:       Thss ← measure(ECom.ShockStrength); 
6:       *p ← fetch(ig );        //fetch current heart condition 
7:      *q ← fetch(ih );    //fetch upper limit of safety zone 
8:       *r ←  fetch(il);     //fetch lower limit of safety zone 
9:        if *p = NSR then                      //if heart  is normal 
10:             AbortTherapy(); 
11:             goto 27; 
12:      else if *p = VF then    
13:             Compute  SZECom ;               //boolean variable 
14:             if  SZECom then      //the energy is in safe range 
15:                  DeliverTherapy(); 
16:                  Increment BurstCount;   //additional check   
17:                  mg ←Classify resultant heart condition; 
18:                  if BurstCount ≤ xˊ     
19:                        goto 5;   
20:                  else  //if BurstCount has exceeded average 
21:                        AbortTherapy(); 
22:                        IssueWarning(); 
23:                        goto 27; 
24:             else if Thss > DFTdyn  then 
25:                       Thss ← DFTdyn ; 
26:                       goto 15; 
27: DSt ← RS;   
IV.  FORMAL VERIFICATION 
We use formal verification for our proposed algorithm in 
order to verify its correctness. A finite state model of the 
proposed system is presented in Fig. 3. The model is used to 
identify two types of requirements: Safety and Liveness [22]. 
Safety requirement refers to the behavior of the system that 
must not happen; whereby, liveness requirement means a 
system behavior that will eventually happen.  
Our proposed algorithm comprises three states: Classify, 
Shock and Warning. These states are inter-reachable through 
transition arrows. The numbers on the arrows represent the 
respective Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) requirement as 
explained in Table II. The proposed algorithm has been 
tested for safety and liveness requirements using NuSMV 
verification tool. NuSMV formally verifies LTL properties 
of a given system [23].  
First, the LTL requirements of our proposed algorithm 
were laid out. Next, NuSMV was fed with each requirement 
and resultant verdict from the model checker was obtained. 
For each LTL requirement, our algorithm obtained a pass 
verdict, which implies that all requirements stand formally 
verified. Table II presents the LTL requirements for our 
proposed algorithm. The occurrence of ECom is a pre-
condition for the state model of the proposed algorithm. In 
other words, when the ICD receives an external command, 
the primary algorithm gets paused; these five requirements 
are checked for safety or liveness before any of the shocks 
programmed in ECom are initiated. The output of classify is 
internally used as an input for the states of  Shock  and 
Warning.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Finite state model of the proposed algorithm. 
TABLE II.  LTL REQUIREMENTS 
T
ra
ns
iti
on
 
LTL Requirement  Type Output 
1 
Check: VF state active AND number of 
shocks delivered are less than or equal 
to counter variable (Burstcount) AND 
shock strength in ECom is within the 
safety range 
Liveness Shock 
2 Check: Normal heartbeat Safety Warning 
3 Check: Shock strength in ECom is outside safety range Safety Warning 
4 Check: The number of shocks delivered is greater than counter variable Safety Warning 
5 Check: The number of shocks delivered is less than or equal to counter variable Liveness Classify 
 
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
To analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm, 
the surrogate values of energy allegedly entered by an 
adversary at the interface of a simulated controller are 
randomly generated. These values are then used to ascertain 
if a shock of a certain energy level is sufficient to 
defibrillate successfully. This can turn malicious attempts 
into defibrillation therapies.  
The average number of therapies required for each of the 
16 episodes of VF is assumed randomly as 3, 1, 2, 3, 2, 1, 2, 
3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 2. These values span a range between 1 
and 3, depicting the usual number of therapies required, on 
average, by the ICD to successfully defibrillate [24]. The 
average energy value for each episode is assumed randomly 
between 18 and 40. This range specifies the most common 
values of energy (in joules) used by ICD for therapies [18]. 
The values are taken as 25, 28, 20, 32, 22, 18, 23, 30, 40, 25, 
21, 19, 30, 25, 26, 35. The calculations for the sample mean 
are performed on these values. Further, statistical 
computations are made on the basis of values obtained from 
the first step. 
 
Fig. 4.  Anatomy of DFT Dynamic and lower threshold of shock energy. 
 
Fig. 5. Average number of therapies administered for a sample of 16 
episodes of VF. 
 
Fig. 4 plots the average energy of the total number of 
shocks administered per episode of VF for Patient A. A total 
of sixteen episodes of VF are taken for the month of 
December 2017. It becomes obvious through this pictorial 
representation that using an upper threshold of energy might 
not be safe, as its value exceeds the maximum energy for the 
entire range of values under examination. The proposed 
algorithm uses the mean of average energy values added in 
the mean of standard deviation computed previously for 
each value to ascertain dynamic DFT (that is, the safe upper 
threshold). 
 
In the following, Cases 1 and 2 elucidate how the 
proposed algorithm caters varying values of shock strength 
in ECom, whereas Case 3 examines how an additional check 
curtails a string of successive shocks.  
 
Case 1. External shock strength lies within safety zone: 
Consider, for example, a scenario where the ICD detects an 
external command with the instruction to administer a shock 
of 40 J (890 Volt) [5]. For computing safety zone, assume 
that the proposed algorithm is currently using the December 
2017 window, where the sample size n =16 (total number of 
VF episodes in the month). Against each episode, the 
average energy value is used to compute mean (ceiling) of n 
episodes: Eˊ = 27. A single value of ĒVFi is the mean of total 
energy required for the specific number of shocks to restore 
NSR for one episode of VF. Next, the standard deviation 
computed for each episode is used to compute the mean 
standard deviation (ceiling) for n values. s̅ = 7. The upper 
limit of the safety zone is now computed by adding 10 J to 
E' plus ?̅?, refer to Equation (4), which gives the value of 44 
as DFTdyn. The proposed algorithm now compares the shock 
strength of the first shock instruction of ECom with 44. 
Since 40J < 44J, the proposed algorithm establishes that the 
shock strength of external command lies below the 
maximum shock energy threshold for Patient A, and thus 
initiates the shock. 
 
Case 2. External shock strength exceeds upper threshold 
of safety zone: Assume that the shock strength of the 
external command is 55 J and the heart condition as 
classified by the primary algorithm is VF. A defibrillation 
shock remains a requirement. The algorithm, upon entering 
Statement 25, assigns the value of  DFTdyn  to Thss. Thus, the 
maximum energy shock that can be administered is equal to 
the upper bound of the safety zone. Since there is no study 
so far, to the best of our knowledge, that gives a comparison 
between incremental (mostly used by primary algorithm of 
ICD) and high-energy (override through programmer) 
shocks, the possibility of deploying shock commands in 
override mode have a higher probability of providing 
successful defibrillation, in addition to letting the additional 
charge time allow termination of non-sustained arrhythmic 
conditions [24].    
 
 
Case 3. Curtailing the number of shocks to BurstCount: 
Consider that an external command is detected with a series 
of shocks to be administered, assuming the shock energy of 
each falls under the maximum limit of 44 J, allowing the 
proposed algorithm to initiate therapy. After each therapy, 
the proposed algorithm increments a counter variable 
BurstCount which is initialized to 0 and compares that with 
pre-computed x' = 2. Fig. 5 elaborates how the value of x' is 
computed for a window of n values. Hence, after two 
instances of therapies, the comparison will result in a False, 
and further therapy will be aborted with a warning beep. 
 
A. Overheads Analysis 
Time complexity. The proposed algorithm costs a 
constant time factor for its variable assignments, 
comparisons, and computation of statistical parameters. 
However, the time complexity of the comparison statement 
of BurstCount with  xˊ  is O (k · n), where k is a constant 
such that 0 < k ≤ 1. If the value of pre-computed  xˊ equals 
the number of therapies in the external command, the worst-
case time complexity of the algorithm becomes O (n). To 
save the time complexity, the lower/upper bounds of the 
safety range (equations (4) and (5)) can be precomputed and 
stored in the ICD microcontroller.  
 
Space overheads. Ignoring the single bit requirement of 
the Boolean type variable Flag, the three pointers cost 4 
bytes each, and the variable BurstCount of integer type costs 
1 byte. Hence, the total approximate space overhead is 13 
bytes, which is a fraction of the typically available 128 KB 
of memory [8]. 
 
Energy consumption. Each notification beep of the ICD 
costs negligible voltage of the lithium battery. The proposed 
algorithm initiates only one warning beep and proposes beep 
accompanying vibration for up to 3 seconds, which is half 
the duration of most standard delivery vibrations. Also, the 
number of notifications for a single event is proposed to be 
curtailed to at most two recursions, thereby not posing a 
resource hungry constraint. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This study proposes a novel scheme to enhance safety 
and security of ICDs. To mitigate the adversarial attacks, the 
proposed method employs a fail-safe logic, which is 
incorporated as a part of the source code within ICDs. This 
method was devised to counter an attack that could 
potentially endanger the patient’s life. To mitigate this 
attack, our proposed algorithm uses the latest window of 
patient data to compute the required upper threshold of 
shock energy that can successfully defibrillate. The upper 
threshold is then used as a sanity check to detect and weed 
out high-energy shocks initiated by adversaries. 
Additionally, the algorithm is capable of converting life-
threatening commands to defibrillation therapies by limiting 
the energy to the upper threshold. For a third counter-
measure, our scheme uses a recent history of patient data to 
keep a track of the number of times therapy is required for 
each episode of VF. This counter is used as a check to 
compare how many times the external command has 
successfully initiated the shock, and hence, maintains 
patient’s safety.  
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